The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court

Appellants brought an action against the respondent bus company. After the Superior Court of Fresno County (California) refused to grant appellants' motion for a continuance, the trial court entered a nonsuit judgment in favor of the bus company at the close of the appellants' case. Appellants sought review.

On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to grant them a continuance to enable them to procure the testimony of a witness on their behalf. Upon review, the court found appellants' arguments without merit. After receiving the witness's letter that she was unable to attend the trial on November 19, 1935, appellants did nothing until January 11, 1936, when one of their attorneys interviewed the witness and found that the statements contained in her letter were true. Visit employee rights attorney Los Angeles to know all about employee rights in Los Angeles.

On January 17, 1936, one of the attorneys informed the bus company's counsel of the desire to continue the case and was informed that any motion for a continuance would be opposed. No effort was made to take the witness's deposition. The town that the witness lived in was more than 100 miles from the place of trial, and the witness's personal attendance on the trial could not have been forced by subpoena. Under such circumstances, ordinary prudence should have suggested the taking of her deposition because reliance on her mere promise to appear at the trial, if made, could not have been enforced and, if violated, might not have furnished grounds for a continuance.

The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant’s attorney appealed from a decision of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California) that awarded plaintiffs, co-counsel, 50 percent of a contingent fee received by the defendant after successfully settling a case in which the parties worked together.

Defendant retained plaintiffs as co-counsel. Plaintiff’s partner was to handle most of the legal work. The parties orally agreed to evenly divide the contingent fee on the case. Subsequently, the plaintiffs' partnership dissolved and the defendant and the plaintiff partner continued to work on the accident case until the plaintiff partner was appointed a judge's position. Plaintiff’s partner urged the defendant to seek the plaintiff’s co-partners help in prosecuting the case, but the defendant refused due to personal reasons. The accident case ultimately settled, and plaintiffs sued for their fees. The trial court held that the joint venture entered into by the parties entitled plaintiffs to 50 percent of the fees received by the defendant. The appellate court, however, reversed the trial court judgment and awarded plaintiffs the reasonable value of the legal services rendered, prorated on the basis of the original contract price. The court held that because the plaintiff partner became incapable of performing the contract of association with the defendant, the obligations of the parties to the contract were discharged because it was contemplated that the plaintiff partner would perform substantial services under the agreement.

The appellate court reversed a trial court judgment awarding plaintiffs, co-counsel, 50 percent of a contingent fee obtained by defendant’s attorney. The court found that the plaintiff partner became incapable of performing the contract of association with the defendant; therefore, the obligations of the parties were discharged, because it was contemplated that the plaintiff partner would perform substantial services under the agreement.

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