Superior Court of Mendocino County

Procedural Posture

Plaintiff supplier challenged an order of the Superior Court of Mendocino County (California), which entered judgment for defendants, bank, directors, and stockholders, in the supplier's action to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentations and promises.

Overview: civil lawsuit attorneys Los Angeles

The supplier furnished materials to a contractor, who had assigned its right to all monies received on a project to the bank. The supplier went to the contractor in order to collect on his claim for unpaid materials. However, instead of collecting on the claim or filing a stop notice, he talked with the directors and stockholders of the bank. They informed the supplier that monies due on the project were forthcoming and were more than sufficient to pay the bills against the project, which bills were to be paid by the bank. However, when the monies came in, the bank satisfied its own claim and placed the balance in the contractor's account. The supplier sought damages, contending that false representations prevented him from filing as stop notice. In affirming the judgment in favor of the bank, directors, and stockholders, the court stated that the directors and stockholders made no promise to substitute themselves as principal debtor in the stead of the contractor, the supplier gave no consideration for such alleged substitution, and the supplier was not bound to withhold the filing of a stop notice. Further, there was no evidence that the representations were false when made.

Outcome

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment entered in favor of the bank, directors, and stockholders in the supplier's action to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentations and promises.

The claimant allegedly performed the services of a companion, a housekeeper, and a nurse for the decedent in consideration of the decedent's promise to provide for the payment of the services in her will. The claimant's bills presented to the executor on November 30, 1986, and December 1, 1986, for services to the decedent from June 1, 1895, to January 21, 1896, were rejected by the executor. The executor alleged that the claims against the estate were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that the trial court properly denied the executor's general demurrer to the complaint. The complaint stated a cause of action for the reasonable value of services performed by the claimant to the decedent in her lifetime. The demurrer could not be sustained on the supposition that the statute barred a part of the cause of action. The court held, however, that the trial court erred in its admission of evidence and its judgment in favor of the claimant. The evidence should have been limited to those claims for services that were rendered within two years of the decedent's death. The court held that a substantial portion of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

Outcome

Real parties in interest, a corporation and its officer, prevailed in a breach of contract action against petitioners, company and its officers. Petitioners filed motions to set aside as void the default judgment entered against them because it granted relief in excess of that sought in the complaint. The trial court declined to rule on the motions because of procedural defects. After the trial court denied their subsequent motion for reconsideration for the same reason, petitioners filed an action against real parties in interest seeking to vacate the default judgment. Respondent court held that petitioners were vexatious litigants within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391(b)(2) because they were attempting to relitigate the issue of the validity of the judgment in the prior case and had no reasonable probability of success. In a writ proceeding, the court held that respondent erred in its determination because there had not been a final determination on the merits of petitioners' contention that the default judgment was void.

Outcome

The court issued a peremptory writ which set aside respondent court's order that petitioners, company and its officers, were vexatious litigants because the merits of petitioners' claim that the default judgment was void had never been determined.

The court reversed the trial court's judgment.

I'm Anne Tyner. I provide guest post service