Superior Court of Santa Clara County

Procedural Posture

Petitioner landlord sought a writ of mandate to compel respondent, the Superior Court of Santa Clara County (California), to vacate its decision to grant summary judgment for tenants in their suit against petitioner for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and infliction of emotional distress.

Overview: eeoc.

Tenants sued petitioner landlord for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and infliction of emotional distress after petitioner claimed it refused tenants' requests to sublease property. Respondent trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of tenants. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437(c)(l) to compel respondent to vacate its decision. The court granted petitioner's writ of mandate and reversed summary judgment for tenants. The court stated that summary judgment was inappropriate as to petitioner's right to refuse consent to sublease because the declarations presented a factual dispute over whether consent was requested of petitioner regarding a prospective tenant. Summary judgment also did not rest on any comparison of the volume of similar products sold by petitioner and other prospective tenants, who operated a competing business. The court also stated that petitioner did not necessarily act unreasonably in refusing to consent to a sublease to a competitor. If tenants' behavior was reasonable, then petitioner was acting within its express powers under the lease.

Outcome

The court granted petitioner landlord's request for a writ of mandate and reversed respondent trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for tenants in their suit for breach of contract and other claims after petitioner refused consent to sublease. The judgment was improper as to petitioner's right to refuse consent to sublease where the declarations showed a factual issue as to whether petitioner's consent was requested.

Overview

Absent either of these elements, a liquidated damages provision was void, although breaching parties remained liable for the actual damages resulting from the breach. Here, the lessor neither pleaded nor proved that damages were impracticable or extremely difficult to fix, and thus he was not entitled to the presumption that the late fee represented actual damages. Under these circumstances, the late fee was void.

I'm Anne Tyner. I provide guest post service